The conflict mineral tantalum, illegally transported out of the war-ravaged Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), is reaching international markets and everyday consumer goods, even with existing compliance measures in place.
Who purchases illegally transported coltan from Rwanda?
What happened to more than 2,000 tons of illegally traded conflict coltan?
The stolen minerals originate from mines located in Rubaya within the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), which generate 15 percent of the world's tantalum a vital component used in electronic devices such as mobile phones, computers, and vehicles globally.
The Rubaya mines now serve as a primary income generator for M23's violent conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo. By capturing large regions, the militant organization supported by Rwanda's army has caused the deaths of thousands and forced hundreds of thousands of people from their homes, carrying out kidnappings and torture without facing consequences.
However, after the coltan is illegally transported to Rwanda, very little information exists regarding who purchases it or its final destination.
Over the course of a year-long study, Global Witness tracked the conflict coltan from the mines in the DRC through the borders and into international supply networks. They uncovered the involvement of Rwandan authorities, as illegal trafficking hit "record-high" levels.
As Rwanda's coltan exports have increased by more than double in the last three years, we found the seven firms responsible for exporting 85% of the coltan.
By speaking with individuals involved in smuggling coltan, we discovered that at least five out of these seven firms purchase conflict-related coltan from the Democratic Republic of Congo, which they then sell via intermediaries to metal refineries in China and Kazakhstan.
Inside the smelting facilities, coltan is transformed into tantalum. This material then serves as a key ingredient in producing capacitors, which are crucial parts of electronic gadgets.
Our research revealed that conflict coltan might have unintentionally reached major international companies such as Microsoft, Vodafone, Sony, Amazon, Nvidia, LG Display, Ericsson, Toyota, and Apple – ending up in everyday consumer goods.
Approximately 15 years back, a framework emerged in the East African region aimed at halting the flow of funds from mineral resources into conflicts.
The latest conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo serves as an example. Our research shows that the due diligence and tracking mechanisms have not succeeded in severing the connection between warfare and natural resources.
Instead, the a traceability system called ITSCI Many multinational corporations depend on this mechanism to ensure their supply chains remain free from conflicts, yet it is being utilized to clean a significant portion of illicitly imported coltan. Coltan linked to the conflict may have also entered an alternate framework known as Better Mining.
Audits conducted by the Responsible Minerals Initiative have not been able to identify conflict-related coltan within smelters' supply networks.
In the meantime, with the conflict persisting in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, the global community has not implemented meaningful measures.
Region affected by M23 rebels in DRC Data provided by IPIS study, revised on 12 December 2025.
Note: the highlighted region shows estimated boundaries based on current reports and could be updated. It is not an established front line or permanent territorial boundary.
War in eastern DRC
A violent conflict has raged in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo for almost thirty years. Starting approximately in 2022, the M23 rebel group, supported by Rwanda, has taken over significant portions of North and South Kivu provinces. Their movement has resulted in numerous deaths and forced many tens of thousands of residents to flee their homes, with both factions facing allegations of serious violations of human rights. In regions under their control, M23 has established an oppressive alternative government system.
Rubaya: A military acquisition of M23
The area known as Masisi in North Kivu contains some of the most valuable coltan reserves globally. Mines near the town of Rubaya contribute approximately 15% of worldwide tantalum needs. At the end of 2023, M23 strengthened control over key transportation corridors surrounding Rubaya, and by April 2024, it took possession of the mines, transforming them into a significant revenue stream for the organization.
Inside the Rubaya mines
Around Rubaya, small-scale miners extract coltan under hazardous circumstances. Multiple landslides have resulted in numerous fatalities. Certain miners shared with Global Witness that they face physical punishment when they refuse directives issued by M23.
From Rubaya towards Goma
Coltan is transported from Rubaya using motorcycles and vehicles. Global Witness accompanied a coltan trafficker across the hills heading to Goma. Along the route, the merchant needed to demonstrate to M23 rebels that he had settled the "fees" demanded by M23.
Entering Rwanda across the border
Previously, smuggling required lengthy, indirect nighttime trips across sparsely guarded borders. After M23 seized control of Goma, shipments frequently move openly past Rwandan authorities at the city’s “Grande barrière” checkpoint. United Nations specialists believe that over 120 tons of coltan have been illegally transported monthly from Rubaya to Rwanda since April 2024.
Kigali: Coltan conflict turns into "Rwandan"
Inside Rwanda, the conflict mineral coltan is frequently combined with locally produced material. Merchants transport it to Kigali, where export firms compile shipments for international purchasers. A significant portion of the illicitly obtained coltan appears to exit Rwanda accompanied by documents from the ITSCI traceability system, which marks it as originating from Rwanda.
A surge in illegal trafficking across Eastern Africa
Starting from Kigali, coltan is transported eastward to the Rusumo border point entering Tanzania, then proceeds to the port in Dar es Salaam and occasionally Mombasa. Legal export of coltan from Rwanda has significantly increased recently, with reported amounts over two and a half times greater in 2025 compared to 2021.
Metal smelting facilities in China, Kazakhstan, and Thailand
Tantalum is produced from coltan transported from East African ports to smelting facilities. The majority of these consignments are sent to smelters located in China, while some also reach those in Kazakhstan, as well as Thailand up until the conclusion of 2023.
From furnaces to worldwide electronic devices
Following the process of melting and purification, tantalum is primarily utilized in capacitors within the electronics and automobile sectors. These components are subsequently integrated into gadgets like smartphones, computers, vehicles, and various other items consumed globally, indicating that conflict-related coltan from the eastern region of the Democratic Republic of Congo might eventually find its way into common devices and international brand supply networks including Microsoft, Vodafone, Sony, Amazon, Nvidia, LG Display, Ericsson, or Toyota.
Coltan financing the conflict
Starting from 2023, the profitable Rubaya mines have turned into a military objective for different fighting factions, similar to what occurred during earlier stages of the conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The UN reported incursions in the mines throughout 2023.
Towards the end of 2023, the M23 insurgent faction seized control of major transportation corridors near Rubaya. By April 2024, it had captured the Rubaya mines , monopolising coltan exports.
Ever since, coltan has emerged as a major - not the primary - source of financial support for M23.
The alternative governance structure of M23 in northern Kivu has selected M23-friendly traders to traffic minerals into Rwanda and has established a tax system at mining and commercial locations.
Merchants pay "fees" for coltan, including $4 per kilogram to M23 and $3 per kilogram to the Rwandan authorities.
Through imposing taxes on the mining and sale of coltan, M23 has raised US$800,000 each month starting from May 2024 as per a United Nations projection.
Coltan smuggle to Rwanda
Rwanda is not solely providing support for M23's military activities in the Democratic Republic of Congo, involving anywhere from 7,000 to 12,000 personnel. Rwandan troops and advanced weaponry however, Rwandan authorities also assist with the trafficking.
Previously, much of the coltan was smuggled through loosely controlled border regions. However, following M23's capture of Goma, most of it has now become... sees them openly spots them right out in the open has them clearly visible can see them without difficulty is aware of their presence notices them readily observes them with ease finds them apparent witnesses them directly perceives them obviously Regarding Rwandan border authorities. Global Witness has also noted officials documenting coltan arriving from the DRC.
United Nations specialists project that from May to October 2024 more than 120 tonnes A month saw people being trafficked to Rwanda, resulting in the "biggest pollution of mineral supply chains" in the Great Lakes Area over the past ten years.
Smuggling has likely grown even further In 2025, within one year after M23 seized control, at least 1,400 tons of coltan—possibly significantly more—has been illegally transported from the Democratic Republic of Congo to Rwanda.
No proof was discovered by Global Witness indicating that Rwandan authorities have seized any illicitly transported coltan over the past two years.
Official data from Rwanda indicates that exports of coltan have increased Over two and a half times higher between 2021 and 2025, indicating an increase in illegal trafficking.
Columbite-tantalite provides a significant source of income for Rwanda, which imposes taxes on it. 5% tax in exports. Since 2023, it has emerged as the nation's second-largest export earner , after gold.
The UN , mineral experts and NGOs has consistently highlighted that Rwanda's mineral export statistics do not match its real output, even prior to the recent increase in exports. The Rwandan government does not release production data from individual mines, making it difficult for specialists to verify its assertions.
A natural resources specialist working on this issue stated that Rwanda has consistently declined to use the analytical fingerprint (AFP), a method created by Germany aimed at determining the source of minerals through their chemical makeup. As a result, this tool, which required significant financial investment to create, has not been utilized for its intended function.
Poor due diligence and lack of transparency
There is a legal requirement to ensure that Rwandan minerals can be tracked prior to export.
ITSCI is the leading due diligence and transparency system in Rwanda, and up until early 2025, all... key coltan suppliers were participants .
The scheme works By giving each bag of coltan and other 3T minerals a distinct numerical tag, ensuring they are believed to be free from conflict and violations of human rights. ITSCI also monitors and handles events throughout the supply chain. (The term "3T minerals" refers to coltan, cassiterite, and wolframite, named for the elements tantalum, tin, and tungsten obtained from them.)
However, our research has discovered that ITSCI is actually being weakened and utilized to launder a significant portion of illegally imported coltan into what appear to be legal supply networks. Global Witness disclosed in a 2022 report namely, since the program was established in 2010, it has been utilized by prominent Rwandan traders to clean significant amounts of illegally transported minerals from the Democratic Republic of Congo.
Four merchants who trade illicitly mined coltan from Rubaya to exporter members of ITSCI informed Global Witness that this coltan is marked under the program, suggesting it is not linked to conflicts.
The [exporting] firm based in Kigali arrives and applies labels to the coltan sourced from Masisi, thereby transforming it into Rwandan coltan.
Coltan smuggler
A coltan trafficker stated that whenever he transported minerals, he could simply contact the Rwandan mining officials who would provide him with as many labels as required.
ITSCI-tagged coltan exports risen almost exactly by the same amount gone up nearly just as much doubled almost identically climbed very closely in proportion escalated practically to the same extent surged almost equally moved upward almost correspondingly increased virtually in tandem rose almost in exact measure ascended almost precisely by the same degree Rwandan coltan exports accounted for nearly 100% of Rwanda's coltan exports between 2023 and 2024.
Yet, coltan imports Reports from other nations regarding coltan originating in Rwanda indicate an increase greater than Rwanda's officially recorded coltan exports in 2024, implying that some portion of the coltan might have been illegally transported out of the country.
Analysis of ITSCI's data indicates that the proportion of tantalite among ITSCI-certified 3T mineral exports rose from 21% in 2020 to 31% in 2024. This rise is hard to understand without considering the growing illegal transport of coltan from Rubaya to Rwanda.
ITSCI's incident reporting also suggests that its members might obtain illicit materials. In 2025, ITSCI documented 70 cases involving doubts about authenticity and improper use of labels.
Every exporter who has been identified by Global Witness as having purchased conflict coltan has been ITSCI members However, three have been suspended since then by ITSCI. In early 2026, ITSCI informed Global Witness that three more exporters were being reviewed and faced potential removal and suspension.
So far, ITSCI has halted or removed six coltan traders from operations since 2024.
In 2025, SLR Consulting's Better Mining expanded its presence as an alternate traceability solution in Rwanda. At minimum, two businesses collaborating with Better Mining, along with another currently undergoing onboarding, were previously part of ITSCI but have since been excluded from the organization.
Two companies, Space Mining and Philbert Trading Minerals, obtained conflict coltan while working alongside Better Mining, as reported by traders we interviewed. We also believe that Sunrise Metal Company, currently undergoing Better Mining's approval procedure, may have purchased conflict minerals.
In contrast to ITSCI, Better Mining does not disclose the names of its participants or any potential issues found within supply chains.
For more than ten years, Better Mining has aimed to present itself as an alternate framework for traceability and due diligence compared to ITSCI, with Global Witness highlighting instances where ITSCI employed unethical methods to maintain its dominant market position.
A different traceability service might contribute positively, provided it encourages improved standards. However, if Better Mining incorporates businesses that obtain conflict minerals and have faced suspension from ITSCI, it produces the reverse impact.
Who trades and purchases Rwandan tantalum?
Between January 2023 and September 2025, only seven Rwandan firms accounted for nearly 85% of the country's coltan exports, as revealed by customs records reviewed by Global Witness.
Coltan originating from Rwanda is transported to the harbors of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania or Mombasa in Kenya, after which it is dispatched for shipment. From early 2023 up to September 2025, seven firms have directly purchased nearly 80% of Rwanda's coltan exports.
Which businesses are purchasing conflict-related tantalum?
Global Witness has uncovered clear proof that at least five out of the seven biggest Rwandan coltan traders have acquired conflict-related coltan from the Rubaya mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo: African Panther Resources , Sunrise Metal Company , Boss Mining Solution , Kanzamin and Philbert Trading Minerals
We discovered that lesser-known exporters Space Mining and Rani Mining also purchased conflict minerals such as coltan from Rubaya.
Signs suggest that additional firms might have also exported conflict-tainted coltan to global markets. ITSCI has reported incidents suggesting illegal activities related to multiple exporters. In addition, some businesses were previously associated with trafficking minerals.
The following table presents data illustrating the links between these Rwandan coltan suppliers and the Rubaya mines in the DRC, as well as their associations with the firms purchasing the coltan.
Due diligence requirements
The OECD Due Diligence Guidance The international benchmark for ethical mineral procurement, established within the framework of conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo, serves as a guideline for ensuring accountable supply chains in regions affected by war and high risk.
The Guide outlines a five-stage procedure which businesses should adhere to when obtaining minerals from regions affected by conflict and considered high-risk. Businesses must promptly cut ties with vendors who pose a significant likelihood of involvement in conflicts and/or severe violations of human rights.
Smelting facilities handling the coltan The coltan being processed at the smelters Facilities refining the coltan Coltan undergoing processing at the smelters The coltan being refined in the smelters Processing of coltan at the smelters Smelters involved in processing the coltan The coltan being treated in the smelters Industrial sites working with the coltan Refining operations involving the coltan
Individuals purchasing coltan directly from Rwanda, as discussed in the prior section, are primarily located in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), China, Hong Kong, and Luxembourg.
However, all these places, except for China, serve as transportation centers, where merchants sell coltan to smelting plants and refineries located elsewhere.
These components retrieve the metal tantalum from coltan through processes involving intense heat and acids to eliminate contaminants, after which refineries further cleanse the tantalum. Smelting facilities and refining plants convert coltan into items such as tantalum powder, wires, or ingots, which serve in producing heat-resisting capacitors, medical implants, and alloys applied in aircraft engines.
Global Witness has pinpointed eight smelting facilities that handled most of the coltan shipped out of Rwanda between 2023 and September 2025:
- Ningxia Oriental Tantalum Industrial Company (OTIC) (China)
- Jiujiang Jinxin Non-Ferrous Metals Company (China)
- Jiujiang Tanbre Co. (China)
- Jiujiang Zhongao Tantalum and Niobium Company (China)
- Ximei Resources (Guangdong) Co., Ltd. (China)
- Hengyang King Xing Lifeng New Materials Company (China)
- Ulba Metallurgical Facility (Ulba) (Kazakhstan)
- Taniobis (Thailand)
China is the leading country for refining coltan originating from Rwanda, both in quantity and the number of smelting facilities. Each significant Rwandan exporter channels some portion of its coltan to China.
In 2023, Rwanda emerged as China's second-biggest source of coltan following Nigeria. In that year, China purchased 1,571 metric tons of coltan from Rwanda, rising to 2,286 metric tons in 2024.
According to customs information, the Ulba Metallurgical Plant (Ulba) located in Kazakhstan also obtained coltan shipments originating from Rwanda during the years 2023 through 2025.
Taniobis, a tantalum refinery located in Thailand, previously sourced coltan from Rwanda up until the conclusion of 2023.
Smelters are considered the pinch point within the supply chain due to their limited quantity and loss of trackability during the melting process.
The OECD Due Diligence Guidelines suggest That 3T smelters and refiners must gather comprehensive details regarding their upstream supply chains and utilize their influence to address potential risks. All 3T smelters and refiners are required to conduct routine assessments of their due diligence processes for minerals sourced from conflict-affected and high-risk regions.
How do smelting inspections cover up supply chain issues?
Our research has revealed that the primary auditing process for smelters and refiners is not effectively detecting ties to conflicts within coltan supply networks.
The Responsible Mineral Verification Procedure ( RMAP ) managed by the Responsible Minerals Initiative (RMI) plays a crucial role in the due diligence process for obtaining minerals from regions affected by conflicts and those with elevated risks. It audits systems and procedures for due diligence of smelters and refiners
In 2024 and 2025, every one of the eight smelters supplying Rwandan tantalum was assessed under RMAP . Every audit except for the one concerning Hengyang King Xing Lifeng New Materials Co. included some portion of the time during which the M23 militant group controlled the Rubaya mines starting from late April 2024.
The dangers associated with obtaining coltan from Rwanda had been widely recognized prior to the evaluation. In 2023, the United Nations highlighted incidents where armed factions entered the Rubaya mines, with minerals being illegally transported to Rwanda. Meanwhile, ITSCI ceased labeling activities at Rubaya starting in December 2023.
All eight smelters were found compliant However, Global Witness and the United Nations have found proof connecting some of them to conflict coltan. According to the evidence, at least four smelters may have refined coltan from Rubaya linked to the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo:
- Jiujiang Tanbre Co. obtained conflict coltan from African Panther Resources, which was transported by Traxys, and may have also acquired it from Sunrise Metal Company.
- Ningxia Orient Tantalum Industry Co. obtained conflict coltan from Sunrise Metal Company
- The company Jiujiang Jinxin Nonferrous Metals might have obtained conflict coltan from Boss Mining Solution via Novacore and from Sunrise Metal Company.
- Ulba has refined coltan obtained from East Rise Corporation, which, as per U.S. claims, acquired conflict-related coltan from the Democratic Republic of Congo.
If processors obtain materials from high-risk suppliers, RMAP mandates them to evaluate the likelihood of mineral sourcing from mines to confirm their origins. Inspectors examine these evaluations alongside trade connections between the mine and the processing companies.
However, processors and auditors typically remain unaware of which additional processors obtain materials from the same mines and in what amounts. Since Rwandan mining firms frequently provide resources to numerous companies, RMI's inspections struggle to perform accurate reasonableness evaluations that contrast all extracted minerals from a mine with its projected output.
RMI cannot use the analytical fingerprint in its evaluations because it isn't implemented, and it also lacks reliance on traceability since the primary system has been extensively utilized for laundering minerals. Consequently, RMI’s inspections cannot confirm whether minerals are being illicitly transported, nor can they guarantee that smelters are free from conflict sources.
However, even with the evident shortcomings, businesses frequently view RMAP certification as proof of a conflict-free supply chain.
In 2025, the European Union will have recognised Under RMAP’s conflict minerals regulations, this implies that companies importing minerals into the European Union may assert that they fulfill their responsibility requirements by depending on the program.
Electronics capacitors: From furnaces to worldwide producers
Tantalum is primarily utilized in capacitors, which are extensively employed in electronic devices such as mobile phones, computers, and automotive systems. It is additionally applied in the aerospace and defense sectors, as well as in medical implants and metal alloying agents.
The market for tantalum capacitors is very consolidated, with approximately five key companies leading the industry: Kemet, Kyocera AVX, Vishay, Panasonic, and Hongda Electronics Corp.
The United States, along with El Salvador, Israel, and the Philippines, has been the top buyers of tantalum from China, where the majority of Rwanda's coltan is refined.
Several capacitor companies function within the United States, such as Vishay, Kyocera AVX, Global Advanced Metals, and Kemet. Kyocera AVX is probably the primary recipient of China’s tantalum shipments to El Salvador, as the firm operates a facility there that it states is the biggest globally. Vishay maintains a significant manufacturing plant in Israel.
Global Witness has uncovered proof of cargo sent from OTIC to Samsung’s branches in the Philippines, home to a Samsung facility that produces capacitors, along with a branch of Panasonic in the same country. The tantalum involved probably originated from areas experiencing conflict.
Downstream companies
Major corporations utilizing tantalum are primarily found in the electronics, technology, automotive, and aerospace sectors. Numerous global brand names worldwide incorporate items made with tantalum obtained from smelters that, as per our findings, have acquired coltan associated with the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
Amazon, Microsoft, Vodafone, Toyota, Sony, NVIDIA, Honda, LG Display, and Ericsson among others report Having items from smelters in their supply chain that, based on our findings, have obtained conflict-related coltan from Rubaya. Conflict coltan finds its way into everyday consumer products like smartphones, computers, and vehicles.
Apple mentions Ulba as a component supplier in its 2023 supply chain. During that same year, Ulba obtained coltan from East Rise Corporation, which may be associated with ongoing conflicts.
In addition to other firms, Apple, which was previously regarded as a pioneer in ethical sourcing from regions affected by conflicts, ceased including its vendors in its filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in 2024.
Recommendations
Rwandan government:
- Remove all military forces from the area of the Democratic Republic of Congo.
- Cease all assistance provided to M23, which breaches the United Nations weapons ban and sanction system.
- Stop illicitly transported minerals and send them back to their home nation.
- Promote the application of the analytical signature.
- Release my level-specific manufacturing data publicly.
Government of the DRC:
- Enhance oversight of the country's military forces and guarantee that breaches carried out by the military and associated fighting groups are examined and those responsible are held accountable.
- Cease assistance to non-state military organizations.
International community:
- Pause the shipment of defense materials to Rwanda.
- Link any formal development aid to Rwanda ceasing its backing of M23.
- The punishment of M23 leaders and high-ranking Rwandan officials involved in misconduct, along with businesses benefiting from the exploitation of conflict minerals.
European Union (in addition to the aforementioned suggestions):
- Implement the EU regulations on conflict minerals and the Corporate Responsibility for Sustainable Supply Chains Directive (CRSCD) Therefore, EU businesses essentially cease purchasing, handling, or dealing with conflict minerals.
- The European Union needs to expand the reach of the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD) so that it covers every stage of operations involving business partners, along with EU-based firms employing over 1,000 people and generating at least €450 million in worldwide net revenue, as well as foreign companies achieving €450 million or more in sales within Europe.
- Cancel the cooperation agreement with Rwanda regarding essential minerals.
- Cease assistance for Rwanda's military activities in Mozambique.
United States (in addition to the suggestions mentioned earlier):
- Strengthen and enforce Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act .
- Steer clear of pacts that link the exploitation of resources with assurances related to safety.
ITSCI:
- Carefully examine Rwanda's involvement with illegally transported minerals from the Democratic Republic of Congo.
- Establish a multi-party management framework that ensures there are no conflicting interests between ITSCI's participants and its verification process.
- Release comprehensive mining-specific production details for minerals categorized by ITSCI.
Better Mining:
- Carefully examine Rwanda's involvement with illegally transported minerals from the Democratic Republic of Congo.
- Release the names of participating corporations along with events associated with their distribution networks.
- Provide comprehensive mining operation-specific output information for minerals identified by Better Mining.
RMI:
- Carefully examine tantalum smelting facilities that obtain materials from the African Great Lakes area.
- Enhance the RMAP inspections by incorporating information that facilitates logical evaluations of mining activities and identification markers.
- Explicitly state that RMAP inspections cannot verify the source of the minerals.
Rwandan exporters:
- Stop buying conflict-affected minerals.
- Conduct thorough investigative checks on supply chains, with particular attention paid to tracking minerals sourced from Congolese mines as alleged.
- Adhere to the OECD Guidelines for Responsible Mineral Supply Chains in Conflict-affected and High-risk Regions.
Traders and processors:
- Cease purchasing coltan from Rwanda until the M23 group has removed its forces from the Rubaya mines, unless the coltan has been examined prior to export through direct verification of its source and quality.
- Adhere to the OECD Guidelines for Responsible Mineral Supply Chains in Conflict-affected and High-risk Regions.
Downstream companies, capacitor manufacturers:
- Engage directly with decision-makers and review their compliance procedures, along with seeking input from relevant stakeholders.
- Request detailed reports from vendors, address and monitor the risks discovered, and include updates on these matters within their respective yearly compliance assessments.
- Cease acquiring tantalum or items containing tantalum from Rwanda until the M23 group has left the Rubaya mines, provided they have carefully examined the coltan prior to shipment by personally verifying its source and classification.
- Adhere to the OECD Guidelines for Responsible Mineral Supply Chains in Conflict-affected and High-risk Regions.
Businesses and sector initiatives react Firms and organizational programs adapt Corporations and trade initiatives adjust Enterprises and industrial efforts modify Organizations and commercial schemes alter Entities and business alliances change Institutions and professional networks shift Establishments and occupational plans evolve Concerns and industry projects accommodate Groups and sectoral arrangements modify
Exporters and traders:
Halcyon verified with Global Witness that it acquired coltan from Kanzamin yet rejected claims that this coltan was sourced from Rubaya. The company referenced its Know-Your-Customer assessments, supply chain records, and both scheduled and unscheduled inspections conducted in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda during 2025, along with steps taken to manage risks—such as ceasing operations with Kanzamin until proof of improved compliance procedures were received. Halcyon stated that Global Witness has not presented specific transaction details showing that materials procured by Halcyon came from Rubaya.
Halcyon stated it has not maintained any formal agreement or business connection with Boss Mining Solutions and also refuted claims of obtaining resources from African Panther Resources in 2024.
It further informed Global Witness that it had ceased all operations with Philbert Trading Minerals as of 2025.
Additionally, Halcyon stated they did not acquire any materials from Rubaya in 2023, citing geo-fingerprinting related to coltan sourced from North Kivu.
SOGECOM firmly refuted claims that the Kotecha family benefited from conflict minerals over the past 30 years. The company stated that no proof has been provided to back the accusations made against Ramnik O. Kotecha, as well as against SOCOMI. Additionally, it mentioned that there are no disciplinary or legal actions taken against SOGECOM or any members of the Kotecha family concerning the purchase of conflict minerals from the Democratic Republic of Congo or associated violations.
It informed Global Witness that Ketankumar Kotecha was a shareholder of SOGECOM and its earlier version SOCOMI, yet he had no operational involvement.
SOGECOM refuted claims of obtaining conflict minerals from the Rubaya mines, citing its ongoing surveillance of the region, field inspections, and "geo fingerprinting," a method utilizing the chemical and mineralogical characteristics of the minerals.
SOGECOM refuted claims of purchasing coltan from the two primary mining areas in Rubaya following late 2021, yet acknowledged selling coltan to Halcyon in 2023.
Novacore responded to Global Witness's inquiry by stating that following a trip to Kigali "to become acquainted... with the operations of Boss Mining Solutions," they found "no irregularities" in the company's exported quantities and confirmed that "the shipments were sourced from Rwanda and meet the standards of the ITSCI program."
African Panther Resources had earlier rejected claims of obtaining conflict-related coltan from Rwanda, citing their standard verification processes, yet failed to respond to Global Witness's inquiry regarding ongoing purchases of such materials.
Traxys acknowledges purchasing coltan from African Panther Resources, Rani Mining, and Hillside Mining, yet firmly rejects the claim that the coltan originated from the Democratic Republic of Congo and was linked to hostilities.
Traxys informed Global Witness that the composition of the purchased coltan differed from that found in the Democratic Republic of Congo, that the materials they acquired could be linked to particular mining locations in Rwanda, and that a representative from Traxys frequently inspected the activities at the facilities of African Panther Resources.
Traxys mentioned that it entered into agreements with Hillside and Rani prior to the temporary halt of African Panther Resources, noting that both firms have operated within the regional market for an extended period. It emphasized that Traxys did not overlook warning signs but rather improved its investigation process by obtaining supplies directly from certain mines rather than through middlemen in Rwanda.
Traxys stated that terminating relationships with troublesome vendors happens quickly and mentioned that it stopped obtaining tantalum from Rwanda in May 2025.
Minterra informed Global Witness that it did not find any evidence of smuggling or trade involving conflict minerals from East Group Minerals, citing its participation in the ITSCI program and oversight processes. It further stated that all reported ITSCI issues had been addressed.
Minterra stated that "rises in exported amounts should be considered against the backdrop of beginning from a comparatively modest baseline" for exports. Minterra did not reveal particular mining operations or the exact volumes it obtained from each, as asked by Global Witness.
Tawotin refuted claims of obtaining conflict-related materials from the Democratic Republic of Congo in recent years and had also previously rejected such allegations in the 2010s. The company informed Global Witness that its coltan exports rose in 2024 due to being inactive for part of the previous year.
Tawotin further stated that it adheres to sanction frameworks and thus needed to locate an alternative purchaser following East Rise Corporation being subjected to U.S. sanctions.
Both Tawotin and Chris Huber deny having any connection between them, with Huber also stating that he has never been a beneficial owner or part of Tawotin.
CDMC refutes claims of trading conflict minerals sourced from the Rubaya mines, citing "verification and monitoring procedures" along with a brief halt following warnings. Both CDMC and Crawley reject any association between them.
Several companies including Kanzamin, Boss Mining Solution, Rani Mining, Sunrise Metal Company, Better Off Equipment & Solutions, Philbert Trading Minerals, Space Mining, East Group Minerals, and East Rise Corporation did not respond to Global Witness's invitation for commentary.
Processors:
OTIC, Jiujiang Tanbre Company, and Jiujiang Jinxin Non-ferrous Metals Company stated they have not obtained materials linked to conflicts, citing their due diligence processes as aligned with the OECD Due Diligence Guidelines according to information provided to Global Witness.
Ulba told Global Witness that it has purchased coltan from East Rise Corporation but claims the coltan is not associated with violence, citing its risk assessment via RMAP and its procedure of halting supply relationships if companies are involved in conflicts. Additionally, it stated that it ceased purchasing "from the area" in May 2024, which includes transactions with East Rise Corporation.
Taniobis informed Global Witness that it ceased obtaining coltan from the Democratic Republic of Congo or Rwanda by the end of 2023.
Companies involved in downstream operations and producers of capacitors:
Toyota stated to Global Witness that it will not accept violations of human rights and seeks to obtain minerals free from conflicts, mentioning the thorough investigations conducted with vendors and quickly handling any discovered issues.
Sony stated that it is dedicated to establishing an ethical supply chain and requires all vendors to adhere to its supply chain code of ethics and guidelines, which it ensures through remedial measures.
Ericsson stated that it works alongside the RMI, noting that the smelting facilities mentioned by Global Witness comply with RMI standards, and that it intends to examine individual instances.
Apple informed Global Witness that with the worsening situation in the area, it advised its vendors to halt buying 3T and gold from the DRC and Rwanda. This action was taken because Apple feared that current industry verification systems were unable to carry out proper checks, and it had also boosted its backing for groups assisting local populations.
Apple remained silent in response to Global Witness's inquiries regarding the reason behind its decision to cease disclosing processor information within its 2024 SEC filing, as well as how it manages to source coltan without relying on suppliers from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Rwanda, considering the significance of the DRC as a major producer of coltan and the common practice among smelting and refining facilities to blend materials from various regions.
Samsung informed Global Witness that, following an assessment, it did not have any issues with its dealings with OTIC, referencing OTIC's RMI audit.
Global Witness has not received responses from Nvidia, Amazon, Microsoft, Vodafone, Panasonic, and LG Display regarding their inquiries.
Industry schemes:
ITSCI responded to Global Witness's inquiry by stating that its system remains operational and effective, highlighting its process for reporting incidents, imposing suspensions, sending communications to ITSCI members regarding significant risks, asking for clarifications on their due diligence practices, gathering more information from mining sites for verification purposes, intervening directly with exporters when issues arose, and conducting training sessions.
With regard to the higher proportion of tantalite within the minerals exported by ITSCI, ITSCI informed Global Witness that this combined data provides little useful information, and that ITSCI carries out more efficient reasonableness checks at the level of an individual mine or specific mineral transaction.
Global Witness has asked for detailed information regarding mining output and supplier dealings from ITSCI, yet ITSCI has refused to provide it, claiming it is confidential.
ITSCI informed Global Witness that it is no longer the leading tracking system, apparently highlighting the year 2025 specifically, and had earlier rejected claims of holding a monopolistic position. ITSCI has previously refuted allegations that its program was utilized for laundering large quantities of minerals in the past and that it employed improper methods against Better Mining.
Global Witness questioned ITSCI about the removal of the ban on African Panther Resources but has yet to receive an answer.
Better Mining rejects claims of labeling coltan from conflict zones. The company stated that its due diligence and tracking system relies on an enrollment process, assessment of the supply chain, ground-level oversight, regulated tagging, recordkeeping for tracing, continuous hazard detection within a set operational structure, along with independent inspections.
It refutes claims made by Global Witness regarding the provision of proof that materials from conflict zones were included in the Better Mining tracking system and asked for more detailed information.
Better Mining also informed Global Witness that no determination has been made regarding whether to include Sunrise Metal Company, and the firm has not yet obtained any labels from Better Mining.
RMI responded to Global Witness’s invitation for commentary by stating that the assertion that RMAP inspections cannot guarantee conflict-free smelting is baseless. RMI noted that Global Witness's trade data contains flaws, including overlooking "the frequently substantial time gap between mining activities and global commerce."
RMI stated "at least one instance" of "prolonged storage (12+ months) of a consignment before it reaches the smelting facility." "Therefore, shipping records from 2025 and 2024 could still be under ongoing evaluation or might not be examined until 2026."
RMI further stated, "numerous data entries mentioned in the Global Witness report used to back claims about possible funding linked to the conflict are older than the intensification of hostilities in eastern DRC."
RMI did not respond to Global Witness's inquiry regarding which cargo was received following a prolonged storage period, referring to privacy concerns.
RMI stated that it has taken considerable steps to explain the range and constraints of RMAP evaluations to its members and other interested parties.
T.I.C. stated that its members' adherence to legal requirements continues to be solely their personal duty, and that a guide for improved due diligence assists its members in meeting their responsibilities.
Government:
The Rwanda Mining, Oil, and Gas Board (RMGB), which oversees Rwanda's mineral industry, failed to respond to inquiries from Global Witness.
Methodology
The Global Witness inquiry was conducted through comprehensive field and desktop studies spanning an entire year, analyzing trade information and conducting conversations with more than 70 individuals from governmental bodies, the business world, non-governmental organizations, and academic institutions, verifying our conclusions against those of United Nations and nonprofit organization probes as well as additional resources.
To locate coltan exporters and purchasers, Global Witness examined and verified import and export records from various sources, including information gathered by C4ADS and SOMO (The Counter).
We separated coltan shipments from Rwanda by applying appropriate HS codes and item details, locating entries where the shipment source was noted as Rwanda.
We normalized company names to address different spellings and possible typos found in various data sets, and removed duplicate entries where identical shipments seemed to be recorded multiple times, such as at Rwanda’s border and then again at exporting ports when goods were placed aboard vessels.
Who purchases illegally transported coltan from Rwanda?
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Tagged: Africa, Human Rights, NGOs and Civil Society, Congo-Kinshasa, Rwanda, Mining, Central Africa, East Africa, Economy, Business and Finance
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